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Today, many countries, regardless of developed or developing, are trying to promote 
decentralization. According to Manor, as his quoting of Nickson’s argument, 
decentralization stems from the necessity to strengthen local governments as proxy of 
civil society to fill the yawning gap between the state and civil society (Manor [1999]: 
30). With the end to the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union rendering 
the cause of the “leadership of the central government to counter communism” 
meaningless, Manor points out, it has become increasingly difficult to respond flexibly 
to changes in society under the centralized system. 
Then, what benefits can be expected from the effectuation of decentralization? 
Litvack-Ahmad-Bird cited the four points: attainment of allocative efficiency in the 
face of different local preferences for local public goods; improvement to government 
competitiveness; realization of good governance; and enhancement of the legitimacy 
and sustainability of heterogeneous national states (Litvack, Ahmad & Bird [1998]: 5). 
They all contribute to reducing the economic and social costs of a central government 
unable to respond to changes in society and enhancing the efficiency of state 
administration through the delegation of authority to local governments. 
Why did Indonesia have a go at decentralization? As Maryanov recognizes, 
reasons for the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have never been 
explicitly presented (Maryanov [1958]: 17). But there was strong momentum toward 
building a democratic state in Indonesia at the time of independence, and as indicated 
by provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, there was the tendency in 
Indonesia from the beginning to debate decentralization in association with 
democratization. That said debate about democratization was fairly abstract and the 
main points are to ease the tensions, quiet the complaints, satisfy the political forces 
and thus stabilize the process of government (Maryanov [1958]: 26-27). 
What triggered decentralization in Indonesia in earnest, of course, was the 
collapse of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The Soeharto regime, regarded as the 
                                                   
1This paper was originally written in Japanese, March 2002.  
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epitome of the centralization of power, became incapable of effectively dealing with 
problems in administration of the state and development administration. Besides, the 
post-Soeharto era of “reform (reformasi)” demanded the complete wipeout of the 
Soeharto image. In contraposition to the centralization of power was decentralization. 
The Soeharto regime that ruled Indonesia for 32 years was established in 1966 under 
the banner of “anti-communism.” The end of the Cold War structure in the late 1980s 
undermined the legitimate reason the centralization of power to counter communism 
claimed by the Soeharto regime. The factor for decentralization cited by Manor is 
applicable here. 
Decentralization can be interpreted to mean not only the reversal of the 
centralized system of government due to its inability to respond to changes in society, 
as Manor points out, but also the participation of local governments in the process of 
the nation state building through the more positive transfer of power (democratic 
decentralization) and in the coordinated pursuit with the central government for a new 
shape of the state. However, it is also true that a variety of problems are gushing out in 
the process of implementing decentralization in Indonesia. 
This paper discusses the relationship between decentralization and the 
formation of the nation state with the awareness of the problems and issues described 
above. Section 1 retraces the history of decentralization by examining laws and 
regulations for local administration and how they were actually implemented or not. 
Section 2 focuses on the relationships among the central government, local 
governments, foreign companies and other actors in the play over the distribution of 
profits from exploitation of natural resources, and examines the process of the ulterior 
motives of these actors and the amplification of mistrust spawning intense conflicts 
that, in extreme cases, grew into separation and independence movements. Section 3 
considers the merits and demerits at this stage of decentralization implemented since 
2001 and shed light on the significance of decentralization in terms of the nation state 
building. Finally, Section 4 attempts to review decentralization as the “opportunity to 
learn by doing” for the central and local governments in the process of the nation state 
building. 
In the context of decentralization in Indonesia, deconcentration 
(dekonsentrasi), decentralization (desentralisasi) and support assignments (tugas 
pembantuan; medebewind, a Dutch word, was used previously) are defined as follows. 
Dekonsentrasi means that when the central government puts a local office of its own, 
or an outpost agency, in charge of implementing its service without delegating the 
administrative authority over this particular service. The outpost agency carries out the 
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services as instructed by the central government. A head of a local government, when 
acting for the central government, gets involved in the process of dekonsentrasi. 
Desentralisasi, meanwhile, occurs when the central government cedes the 
administrative authority over a particular service to local governments. Under 
desentralisasi, local governments can undertake the particular service at their own 
discretion, and the central government, after the delegation of authority, cannot 
interfere with how local governments handle that service. Tugas pembantuan occur 
when the central government makes local governments or villages, or local 
governments make villages, undertake a particular service. In this case, the central 
government, or local governments, provides funding, equipment and materials 
necessary, and officials of local governments and villages undertake the service under 
the supervision and guidance of the central or local governments. Tugas pembantuan 
are maintained until local governments and villages become capable of undertaking 





1. Historical Developments of Local Administration 
 
The function of local administration in Indonesia had long been deconcentration, or the 
agency function for the central government, since the colonial days under Dutch rule. 
Particularly under the colonial rule by the Netherlands until the early years of the 20th 
century, central government officials (pamong praja) dispatched from Batavia 
(present-day Jakarta) kept the control and surveillance over local residents. In other 
words, the government (pemerintah) was synonymous to the institution for the rule and 
control over local residents. 
Instead of the local deployment of central administration by central 
government officials, the emergence of local administration by local organizations on 
their own in relation to decentralization dates back to the 1903 Law on 
Decentralization for the East Indies (Decentralisatiewet 1903). The Dutch colonial 
administration introduced the Ethical Policy out of consideration for social welfare of 
local residents. But the true motive of the introduction of decentralization was to 
lighten the fiscal burden on the colonial administration by having localities take it over. 
Along with decentralization, the control and surveillance over local residents by central 
government officials continued, and thus local administration was placed under the 
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two-tier system that directly involved both central and local governments. The two-tier 
system was abolished, in name, by the 1957 Basic Law on Local Administration (Law 
No. 1/1957), but its legacy had been found in the concomitance of central government 
outpost agencies (kanwil/kandep) and local government departments (dinas) until 2001 
when the latest laws on decentralization enacted. 
 
1.1. Local Administration in the Soekarno Era 
 
The Republic of Indonesia (RI) proclaimed independence in August 1945. But troops 
of the Republic controlled only key portions of Java-Madura and Sumatra, with the rest 
of the territory having little consciousness about independence. After the defeat and 
withdrawal of the Japanese Military, meanwhile, the Dutch returned with the intention 
of reestablishing colonial rule, and tried to retain the influence by establishing the 
Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI, Republik Indonesia Serikat [RIS] in 
Indonesian) in 1949, which would include the areas under control of the RI.  
The 1945 Constitution of the RI had Article 18 on local administration, which 
provided that “the division of the territory of Indonesia into large regions and small 
regions with administrative organizations is stipulated under law that takes into 
account and pay heed to the principle of consultations at state administrative 
organizations as well as inherent rights of areas with distinct characteristics.” The 
provisions of Article 18 are generally interpreted as based on the idea of 
decentralization, not deconcentration2, and on the basis of the article, the Local 
National Committee (Komite Nasional Daerah) under the law for the establishment of 
the Local National Committee (Republic Law No. 1/1945). The Local National 
Committee was later reorganized into the Board of Local Resident Representatives 
(Badan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) to serve as the foundation of local administration. 
In that sense, some regard the law as the first law concerning local administration 
written after the independence (Gie [1993]: 58). Both the Law No. 1/1945 and the 
1948 Basic Law on Local Administration (Republic Law No.22/1948), which was 
designed for full-blown decentralization in the wake of the enactment of the Law No. 
1/1945, were applicable only to Java-Madura under effective control of the RI. The 
                                                   
2 The provisions of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution state: (1) Indonesia, a unified state, is 
divided into provinces, and provinces are divided into smaller regions; (2) autonomous regions and 
simple administrative regions are set up under law, and autonomous regions are to have chambers of 
deputies. Regions with distinct characteristics mean villages, inherent rights of villages (understood 
to mean common law) are to be respected. Based on these provisions, Soejito [1984] and others 
believe that “the 1945 Constitution is conscious of the need for decentralization.” 
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Republic troops were losing ground in the independence war against the Netherlands. 
After the Linggajati Agreement and The Hague Roundtable Meeting, Indonesia 
officially became independent in December 1949 as the RUSI, which included the RI 
(see Map 1).  
 
 
Under the RUSI, the modality of local administration was left to the discretion 
of each area. The Republic Law No. 22/1948 was applicable only to Java-Madura and 
other areas under control of the RI, and the kind of local administration totally different 
from Java-Madura was in place in other areas. For example, the East Indonesia State 
(Negara Indonesia Timur: NIT) set up in 1947 with the support of the Netherlands, 
remained as a component of the Federal Republic and provided for its own local 
administration in the East Indonesia Law, No.44/ 19503. 
The Republic Law No. 22/1948, applicable in Java-Madura and the areas 
under control of the RI, shows distinct marks of its attempts to incorporate measures 
more democratic than decentralization steps seen in Western Europe to counter the 
                                                   
3 East Indonesia Law No. 44/1950 was abolished with the enforcement of the Republic of Indonesia 
Law No. 1/1957. 
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Dutch ambition for re-colonization, including the direct election of local assembly 
members by residents, separation of the head of the local government and the 
chairperson of the local assembly, and the recognition of extensive autonomy by 
making all regions of the republic autonomous regions. The republic government also 
tried to integrate separate decentralization laws and regulations applied to respective 
regions under the colonial rule. But efforts to abolish regional offices of central 
government officials dispatched by the central government, one of the objectives cited 
by the Republic Law No. 22/1948, met extreme difficulty due to the cloggy practices 
of long years. The law failed to be enforced effectively and sufficiently also because 
the central government did not allocate enough budgets to implement local autonomy. 
Component states of the RUSI decided one after another to be integrated into 
the RI, with the single RI established in 1950. With the launch of the new republic, the 
1950 Provisional Constitution was adopted. In the absence of new legislation 
concerning local administration, however, the existing Republic Law No. 22/1948 was 
adopted as laws and regulations governing local administration for the time being. But, 
as mentioned before, the law was written originally on the assumption of 
decentralization for Java-Madura, with little regard to the situation of other regions, 
which had different kinds of local administration. Other regions that came under 
pressure to conform to the way of life in Java-Madura rapidly grew discontent with the 
central government, and as described in Section 2, even attempted regional rebellion to 
threaten the disintegration of the Republic. In response to the situation, the Law No. 
1/1957 was enacted to implement Article 1314 of the 1950 Provisional Constitution. 
The Law No. 1/1957 recognizes “as extensive autonomy as possible” 
(otonomi seluas-luasnya) for regions concerning all powers that the central 
government does not have, and the head of a local government was made responsible 
to a local assembly, separating the head of local administration from the head of local 
legislature for the first time ever. Local residents through a direct election chose local 
assembly members, while local assembly members could dismiss at any time the head 
of a local government who they elected. The central government, in effect, was no 
longer in a position to keep tabs on what local governments may decide.  
                                                   
4 Article 131 stipulates: (1) the division of the territory into large regions and small regions with the 
function of autonomy backed by administrative organizations is stipulated under law that takes into 
account and pay heed to the principle of consultations and the principle of representation at state 
administrative organizations; and (2) regions are granted as extensive authority as possible to 
implement autonomy. The article is more clearly oriented toward decentralization than Article 18 of 
the 1945 constitution, and all it provides for on deconcentration is that the central government “can 
by law have regions undertake services that are not included in matters of jurisdiction in their own 
regions.” 
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Meanwhile, decentralization in fiscal matters got behind far more significantly 
than in decentralization in administrative matters. Until the 1956 Balanced Finance 
Law (Law No. 32/1956) was enacted, the local finance system dating back to the 
colonial days was preserved intact. It was the adjustment accounting (sluitpost) system 
under which fiscal deficits of local governments were covered with subsidies from the 
central government. Local governments had only limited sources of revenue of their 
own, with the ratio of revenue from own sources to total revenue standing at less than 
30% in general (Gie [1994]: 68-69). But the central government kept unilateral power 
to decide amounts of subsidies, and as estimated subsidies were decided in accordance 
with prevailing conditions of the finances of the state on the basis of previous-year 
disbursements, subsidies usually fell short of amounts necessary to cover the deficits of 
local governments. The Law No. 32/1956 5  sought to improve the adjustment 
accounting system, and to boost local governments’ independent revenue sources by 
transforming a total of eight national taxes into local taxes. In reality, however, the 
combined revenue from the eight national taxes fell far short of the amounts of 
subsidies the central government had previously granted to local governments (Gie 
[1994]: 83-84). While the severe fiscal conditions of the central government were 
behind all this, the delay in fiscal decentralization further intensified regional 
dissatisfaction with the central government. 
While it was true that the central government, after the shift to the unified 
state in 1950, tried to move toward decentralization, the progress in decentralization in 
administrative and fiscal aspects, expected to come in the 1950s, failed to materialize 
due to the combination of many factors, including the destabilization of the central 
government, its fiscal plight, the lack of human resources, funding and experiences at 
regional governments, and the transfer of economic interests to the central government. 
With the simmering opposition to the enforcement of the Republic Law No. 22/1948 
combining with discontent with what regions received from the central government in 
exchange for regional contributions to the finances of the state6, the dissatisfaction 
                                                   
5 Since Law No. 32/1956, was put into force on January 1, 1957, it is referred to as the “1957 
Balanced Finance Law.” The official title is the “Law concerning Balanced Finances between the 
State and Regions with the Right of Self-government” (Undang-Undang tentang Perimbangan 
Keuangan antara Negara dengan Daerah-Daerah, yang berhak mengurus rumah tangganya 
sendiri). 
6 For example, the value of exports from Sumatra in January-September 1956 accounted for 71% of 
Indonesia’s total exports, 75% of Sumatra’s imports during the same period came from Java (Gie 
[1994]: 231-232). Sumatra believed that much of the income earned from exports from Sumatra was 
transferred to Java to purchase imports into Java, and demanded the right to engage in trade directly 
with foreign countries without going through Java. Other non-Java regions rich in export 
commodities felt the same way, and as later described in a passage regarding a rebellion in the 
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entertained by non-Java regions against the region of Java (the central government) 
occasionally led to regional rebellions. Under these circumstances, the Law No. 1/1957, 
apart from the content of it, was far from sufficient to wipe out the sense of mistrust 
prevalent in regions against the central government. 
In the face of the incapability of decentralization on the part of local 
governments and their strong discontent with the central government, President 
Soekarno in 1959 declared the reversion to the 1945 Constitution from the 1950 
Provisional Constitution. Thus, Indonesia returned to the system of centralized power 
so familiar since the colonial period, and began the era of “Guided Democracy” with 
broad presidential powers. In local administration, the central government appointed 
the heads of local governments, and local assemblies were deprived of the power to 
dismiss the heads of local governments, giving rise to the administration-led local 
autonomy. The head of a local government thus had the dual function of local 
autonomy (decentralization) and proxy for the central government (deconcentration), 
but it was quite clear that the latter far outweighed the former. This formula of local 
administration in line with the centralization of administrative power was given the 
legal basis by the 1965 Basic Law on Local Administration (Law No. 18/1965), and 
was inherited by the Soeharto era, with the strengthened function of control and 
surveillance over local residents involving security authorities as well. 
 
1.2. Local Administration in the Soeharto Era 
 
Initially, Soeharto, who took over from Soekarno, tried to restore the “as extensive 
autonomy as possible” to local governments as stipulated by the Law No. 1/19577. The 
Decision No. 16/1966, by the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) 
embraced this policy. But the new People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) that was 
formed after the 1971 General Election revoked this decision with its own MPR 
Decision No. 4/1973, and the provision for decentralization was also changed to 
                                                                                                                                                    
PRRI/Permesta region, some regions, including Minahasa in North Sulawesi, openly started to 
engage in contraband trade. 
7 It is not necessarily clear whether the attempt to restore the provision for “as extensive autonomy 
as possible” to local governments simply represented Soeharto’s lip service in reward to Islam forces 
and non-Java regions that help on to the anti-communist camp in confrontation with President 
Soekarno who was considered to be sympathetic to communists or his move reflected the intentions 
of Western countries which backed the establishment of the Soeharto government. But it is hard to 
believe that Soeharto was serious about the promotion of decentralization, because his national 
administration policy was founded on the 1945 constitution and the five principles of the state 
philosophy (Pancasila), both of which deny a federal state. 
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“realistic and responsible local autonomy” (otonomi daerah yang nyata dan 
bertanggung jawab). Accordingly, the Soeharto government enacted the 1974 Basic 
Law on Local Administration (Law No. 5/1974) after a short period of debate of only 
44 days8. 
While the old law allowed “as extensive autonomy as possible” to all the three 
tiers of local governments9, the Law No. 5/1974 clarified that the priority in local 
autonomy was given to the second-level local governments (daerah tingkat II [Dati II], 
equivalent to districts [kabupaten] and cities [kota]). The reason for removing the 
first-level local governments (daerah tingkat I [Dati I], equivalent to provinces 
[Propinsi]) from the focus of local autonomy was that the Soeharto regime, based on 
the experiences of regional rebellions in the 1950s, wanted to forestall the possibility 
of independent-minded Propinsi going for separation and independence and uphold the 
unified state. Further, decentralization under the Law No. 5/1974 meant the transfer of 
authority from the central government to local governments, not the transfer of 
authority from Propinsi to Kabupaten/Kota. Rules for implementation of the local 
autonomy in Kabupaten/Kota were not issued until 1992 (Government Regulation No. 
45/1992). It means that Kabupaten/Kota, the focus of local autonomy, had been unable 
to implement that autonomy for as long as 18 years since the enforcement of the law. 
Given this, the Law No. 5/1974 was far more oriented toward deconcentration than the 
law’s text suggested. It was skewed heavily toward the centralized way of local 
administration, having local governments take over the implementation of various 
services without transferring the powers of the central government to them. 
The centralized formula of local administration in the Soeharto era did not 
stem only from the shortage of human resources and capabilities on the part of local 
governments. Marking a clear break with the Soekarno era, when activities of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) were tolerated, the Soeharto regime was 
inaugurated amid the Cold War as an anti-communist government within the U.S.-led 
capitalist camp. As soon as the Soeharto government was installed, multinational 
enterprises started exploitation of natural resources in Indonesia, and for this, political 
stability was regarded as very important.  
                                                   
8 According to Gie, a bill for the law was submitted to parliament in April 1974. The bill was 
accorded top priority status in deliberations and won parliamentary approval on July 2, 1974 (Gie 
[1995]: 108). The time required was even shorter than the time required for the enactment of two 
decentralization-related laws in April 1999. 
9 Local governments were classified into the three levels of first-level local governments or 
provinces (propinsi), second-level local governments or districts and cities (kabupaten/kota), and 
third-level local governments or counties (kecamatan). Little had been done with the local autonomy 
for third-class local governments. 
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Following the Law No. 5/1974, the Soeharto government enacted the 1979 
Law on Village Administration (Law No. 5/1979), embarking on the control of 
traditional village communities left intact since the years of Dutch colonial rule. Under 
the new law, the central government effectively dismantled village communities that 
had ruled themselves on the basis of common law (adat), and instead uniformly built 
administrative villages called “desa,” a term originating in Javanese, across the 
country10. The law, on the face of it, allowed desa autonomy, but in reality, established 
the system that ensured the central government’s directive be carried to desa at the 
furthest end of the administrative line. In parallel with the administrative 
reorganization, the military established the territorial security system from the central 
government all the way down to desa, substantially strengthening the function of 
control and surveillance over local residents11. This system was established bearing in 
mind the fact that communism spread from the levels of villages in Java during the 
Soekarno era. In addition, the Soeharto regime clamped down hard on Holy War 
Command (Komando Jihad) and other radical Muslim groups seeking the 
establishment of an Islamic state, and has all political and social organizations 
recognize Pancasila as the only principles for their existence by 1985, elevating the 
system of centralization to a near-perfection12. 
However, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s made it necessary to 
redefine the raison d’etre of the Soeharto government as an anti-communist regime. 
Responding to growing domestic developments calling for the political openness and 
                                                   
10 This measure gave rise to conflicts between administrative villages and traditional villages based 
on common law across the country. Particularly noteworthy is the frequent eruption of confrontation 
and disputes between villages (administrative villages) of trans-migrants who moved there under the 
government’s transmigration program and traditional village communities of indigenous residents. 
Since the implementation of the new approach to decentralization in 2001, the trend has been clearly 
toward dismantling administrative villages and restoration of traditional village communities. 
11 In parallel with the realignment of administrative organizations, the military also established the 
regional army commands (Kodam), area army commands (Korem) and district army commands 
(Kodim), while stationing army officers (Babinsa) in villages for the surveillance of residents. Also, 
at the levels of propinsi and kabupaten/kota, the military organized the Councils of Local Leaders 
(Muspida) comprising local government heads, local assembly speakers, chiefs of local courts, local 
prosecution heads, commanders of area army commands, and local police chiefs. At the guidance of 
the military, the councils performed the function of security adjustment. 
12 Under the Law on Political Parties and Golkar, enacted in February 1985, and the Law on Social 
Organization, enacted in May 1985, all political organizations and all social groups were regarded as 
unlawful organizations unless they embraced Pancasila as the sole basis for the existence of their 
organizations. Muslim organizations that refused to accept Pancasila were branded as extremist 
groups by the security authorities and eventually crushed. After the collapse of the Soeharto regime 
in 1998, the MPR Decision No. 18/1998, effectively abolished the requirement to accept Pancasila 
as the only principles, and any organizations that had once embraced Pancasila were allowed to 
renounce it and embrace Islam as the principles of their existence. 
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economic deregulation from the latter half of the 1980s, the Soeharto government 
issued implementation rules for the Law No. 5/1974 at last in 1992, as previously 
mentioned, to implement the local autonomy by kabupaten/kota. Then, under the 
Minister of Interior Decree No. 8/1995, one each of kabupaten or kota from 26 
provinces across the country, except for Jakarta, was designated as a model local 
government for a two-year experiment on decentralization from April 1995. 
In the experiment, some administrative powers were transferred from the 
central government to propinsi as well as kabupaten/kota, and from first-level 
governments to second-level governments. In reality, however, the transfer of powers 
was mostly from propinsi to kabupaten/kota, with not much of the authority ceded by 
the central government. In the end, the experiment undermined the powers of 
first-level local governments and effectively reinforced the links between the central 
government and kabupaten/kota. Contrary to the stated objective of decentralization, 
kabupaten/kota had the impression that for them, the centralization became even 
stronger. At the same time, propinsi had pent-up frustration after they lost a range of 
administrative powers to kabupaten/kota through the experiment. Without evaluating 
on the results of the experiment, the central government moved toward discussion on 
full-blown decentralization immediately after the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 
May 1998. 
 
1.3. Local Administration in the Post-Soeharto Era 
 
After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, under the banner of “reformasi” (reform), 
the sentiment for unqualified denial of the Soeharto regime quickly spread throughout 
the Indonesian society. Soeharto’s successor, President B.J. Habibie, the last vice 
president under the Soeharto regime, was regarded as a Soeharto protégé, and as such 
under heavy pressure to get rid of anything reminiscent of Soeharto from around him. 
For this and other reasons, Habibie announced a string of democratization measures, 
including election reform and abolition of restrictions on the freedom of speech, and 
conducted a review of the centralization of powers. The Law on Local Administration 
(Law No. 22/1999) and the Law on Balanced Finance between the Central and Local 
Governments (Law No. 25/1999), both prepared by senior Ministry of Interior official 
Ryaas Rasyid with the support of Germany’s GTZ, were enacted in April 1999, put 
into force in January 2001. 
The new decentralization initiative under these two laws on decentralization 
has the four distinct features: (1) greater weight to decentralization than 
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deconcentration; (2) the line of responsibility turned horizontal from vertical; (3) clear 
provisions for the allocation of funds from the central to local governments; and (4) 
authorization of the re-application of common law (adat) in village administration. 
First, only the propinsi take the “proxy function for the central government,” 
or the function of deconcentration under the new law, while the old law required not 
only Propinsi and Kabupaten/Kota but also the third-level county (kecamatan) to act 
for the central government. The new laws thus enable Kabupaten/Kota to devote them 
totally only to local autonomy. Furthermore, outpost offices of central government 
ministries and agencies (kanwil/kandep) were abolished, with their functions and 
personnel taken over by propinsi. Except for foreign affairs, national defense, judiciary, 
monetary and finance, religion and others13, the central government administrative 
authorities were all transferred to kabupaten/kota. Propinsi are empowered to adjust 
matters that involve several kabupaten/kota, and supervise and guide kabupaten/kota 
as proxy of the central government.  
Second, the heads of local governments now must primarily be responsible to 
local assemblies, while previously only to the president through Minister of Interior. 
The heads of local governments must submit annual progress reports to local 
assemblies, and if these reports prove insufficient and cannot satisfied with local 
assemblies twice, they can dismiss the heads of government (in case of governors in 
provinces, provincial assembly can propose it to central government because province 
governments are proxy of central government). Under the old law, executive offices 
overwhelmingly had an upper hand over legislative. But the new laws have introduced 
a factor of tension between the executive and the legislative. 
In the allocation of funds from the central to local governments, detailed 
arrangements were made for the passing on to local governments of revenues from oil 
and other natural resources, and the system of General Allocation Funds (Dana Alokasi 
Umum: DAU) was introduced14. This system was introduced to rectify the allocation of 
                                                   
13 Among “others” of the central government’s administrative authorities to be retained are national 
macroeconomic plans, fiscal equalization funds, state administrative and fiscal systems, guidance 
and training of human resources development, utilization of natural resources, strategic sophisticated 
industries, preservation of the environment, and standardization policy. 
14 According to the Law No. 25/1999, revenue sources of local governments are divided into 
independent sources of revenue (local taxes, local retributions, etc.), equalization funds, loans, and 
others. Of these sources, equalization funds are further divided into the local allocation of revenue 
from the land and building tax and other taxes (the central government takes 10 % and local 
governments 90% of the land and building tax revenue; the central government takes 20% and local 
governments 80% of revenue from the land and building acquisition fees, with the central 
government redistributing all of its take to kabupaten/kota); the local allocation of revenue from 
natural resources (the central government takes 20% and local governments 80% of revenue from 
IDE Research Paper No. 2, August 2003 
14 
funds between regions unevenly endowed with natural resources, for an annual 
determination of funds to be distributed under the formula based on such indexes as the 
population, area and economic strength. In addition, the category of Special Allocation 
Funds (Dana Alokasi Khusus: DAK) was created to meet specific needs of funding. 
Village administration can now be reorganized according to local 
characteristics, meaning that common law-based village administration, in place before 
the enforcement of the Law No. 5/1979, can be restored. This is because the system of 
administrative villages (desa) introduced in the Soeharto era did not fit in well with the 
diverse characteristics of traditional villages to give rise to a variety of social problems. 
The term “desa” does not have to be used any longer15. Also, village assemblies 
(Badan Perwakilan Desa: BPD) are created in villages with arranging the name as 
quasi-legislature. 
The decentralization initiative under the new laws allows decentralization 
more substantially than that under the Soeharto regime, but also keeps the aspects of 
deconcentration and support operations. Based on the experiences of the 1950s, the 
central government underscores the principle of “decentralization within the scope of 
the unified state, and the implementation rules for decentralization issued in the past 
two years appear to be trying to put some brakes on the rampant self-centered pursuit 
of interests by local governments as well as potential threats of separation and 
independence movements. In an extension of these efforts, work is under way to revise 
the Law No. 22/199916. 
                                                                                                                                                    
forestry, mining and fisheries; the central government takes 85% and local governments 15% of 
revenue from crude oil; the central government takes 70% and local governments 30% of revenue 
from natural gas); general allocation funds (DAU) equivalent to a minimum 25% of state revenue 
(the rate of allocation is 10% for provinces and 90% for kabupaten/kota; the distribution of general 
allocation funds to local governments is weighted against fund needs and potentials of respective 
regions that are expressed in numerical figures); and special allocation funds (funds are allocated to 
specified regions to meet specific funding needs that cannot be covered by general allocation funds. 
Funding for Special Allocation Funds (DAK) comes partly from the reforestation fund). Funding 
rules have been eased in favor of Aceh and Papua, for which the special autonomy law was enacted. 
15 The term “desa” meaning villages are mainly used in Java and Bali. Villages are called “nagari” 
in West Sumatra, “marga” in South Sumatra, and “lembang” in Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi. In 
other places, indigenous names for villages have been restored, such as “kampung/kampong,” “huta” 
and “boli.” In West Sulawesi and Tana Toraja, the number of villages is on the decline with the 
revival of indigenous names. 
16 According to Soedarsono Hardjosoekarto, director-general of local autonomy at the Ministry of 
Interior, key points in the proposed revision of the Law No. 22/1999 are: (1) by striking out the 
expression that there is no hierarchical relationship between propinsi and kabupaten/kota, 
adjustments between propinsi and kabupaten/kota are normalized; (2) provisions are added to 
resolve the conflicts between local governments over territorial waters; and (3) provisions are 
revised to prevent the heads of local governments from arbitrarily appointing or dismissing 
government employees (Remarks in an interview with the writer at the Ministry of Interior on 
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2. Central-Local Rivalry over a Distribution of Natural Resources Profits  
 
There are different interests in the nation state building between Java, densely 
populated but poor in natural resources, and non-Java, thinly populated but rich in 
natural resources. The rivalry between the central government based on the Indonesian 
capital of Jakarta located in Java, and local governments, especially which are located 
outside Java, leads to the discussion over a distribution of natural resource profits 
between the users and the suppliers in a country where natural resources are quite 
unevenly distributed. Meanwhile, as Indonesia mostly lacks the ability to exploit 
natural resources on its own and has to depend on foreign firms for the exploitation of 
resources it has, the issue of the distribution of natural resource profits is also affected 
by what foreign countries that actually undertake natural resource projects think or by 
international resources markets. 
 
2.1. Background of Regional Rebellions in the 1950s 
 
As described in Section 1, Indonesia did not become an independent state with all 
regions of the territory coming together with a true sense of unity. Even when 
Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed independence in August 1945, many 
regions of the East Indies under Dutch colonial rule had little self-awakening to 
independence. The Republic of Indonesia (RI) that declared it independent and other 
regions formed the unified state only through the establishment of the Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia (RUSI), a federal state, in 1949, while still maintaining their 
respective systems of governance with totally different historical backgrounds.  
But the federal state lasted only eight months. Nationalists backing the RI 
regarded the RUSI as a puppet of the Netherlands, and sought to establish the unified 
state to wipe out the legacy of Dutch rule. There was no trace of calm debate 
conducted over which form of the state, the federal system or the unified system, was 
more appropriate. In non-Java regions, groups that had a part in sustaining colonial 
rule even after the establishment of the RUSI kept their government positions, but 
nationalist activists did not like it at all and acted in concert with nationalist 
movements in the RI17. Thanks to their activities, Indonesia was able to shift from the 
                                                                                                                                                    
August 22, 2001). 
17 In Aceh, where the resistance against the suzerain Netherlands was most fierce, Muslim groups 
waged social reform movements since the early years of the 20th century against the region’s 
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federal republic to the unified republic in such a short period of time. 
Indonesia introduced a uniform local administration system for the whole 
country within the framework of the unified state. Mostly, what it did was the 
application of the system the RI implemented in Java-Madura to other regions of the 
country. Preoccupied with laying the foundation for the unified state, the central 
government could not afford to give full heed to the circumstances of other regions 
where different system of local administration had been in place. In addition, the 
parliamentary cabinet system helped intensify the jockeying for power between 
political parties within the central government, and the resultant succession of 
short-lived cabinets destabilized the foundation of the central government. Meanwhile, 
nationalist activists in regions, who flattered themselves that they greatly contributed to 
the shift to the unified state, felt increasingly discontent with the way the central 
government treated them, which they thought failed to correspond to their contribution. 
The level of their discontents was rising so high that some nationalist leaders in regions 
began to seek separation from the unified state, RI, or even called for a return to the 
federal system which they once rejected. 
The regional discontent in the 1950s culminated in the Muslim revolutionary 
movement, called Darul Islam (DI), and the anti-central regional rebellion as the 
Revolutionary Government of the RI (PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia) rebellion and the Universal Struggle Charter (Permesta: Piagam 
Perjuangan Semesta Alam) rebellion (see Map 2). The DI is the armed struggle to 
establish an Islamic state with Islam as nation-building principles against Pancasila, 
the five principles of the state philosophy included in the 1945 Constitution. In 1949, 
toward the end of the independence war, S. M. Kartosoewirjo declared the 
establishment of an Islamic state in West Java, where a vacuum of power was created, 
followed by the rebellion of Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar in South Sulawesi, the rebellion 
in Aceh under Muhammad Daud Beureu-EH, and others. These and similar 
developments spread and came to be called the DI as a whole. 
The PRRI/Permesta rebellions were regional rebellions that spread in 
non-Java regions such as Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1956-1960. After the first 
nationwide general election in 1955, political party and military leaders in Sumatra in 
late 1956 set up a “council” to seize control of local administration. In Jakarta, where 
                                                                                                                                                    
aristocrats who served as local officials for the Dutch colonial government, under the leadership of 
the All-Aceh Ulama League (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh: PUSI). In Sulawesi, Bugis/Makassar 
indigenous aristocrats and Muslim forces revolted against Christian groups Minahasa and Ambon, 
whom the Netherlands recruited for colonial administration, taking up the initiative in regional 
movements toward the unified state. 
IDE Research Paper No. 2, August 2003 
17 
the central government was located, rivalry grew intense between the alliance of the 
Soekarno-led Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia: PNI) and the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which rapidly increased its presence, and the 
Islamic Masyumi Party. After Vice President Hatta resigned, the Masyumi Party and the 
Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia: PSI) rose in revolt against the 
central government, and the PRRI was set up in Bukittinggi of West Sumatra, led by 
the Masyumi Party’s Sjafruddin Prawiranegara18 and Muhammad Natsir. In March 
1957 in Sulawesi, armed forces officers in region and local politicians declared the 




Economic factors played a significant role in the PRRI/Permesta regional 
rebellions. Regions strongly opposed to the economic interests they had being 
siphoned off their regions to the central government. For example, Sulawesi earned 
huge profits from copra trade since well before the independence. Profits, which were 
                                                   
18  Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, an activist of the Masyumi party, had headed the Emergency 
Government of the RI established in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, in 1948 at the instruction of 
President Soekarno and Vice President Hatta in order to turn around the fortunes of the Republic 
troops which at the time were loosing ground in the independence war. 
IDE Research Paper No. 2, August 2003 
18 
pooled in the Copra Foundation, were made available profligately for infrastructure 
construction and funding activities of political organizations. After the independence, 
however, the head office of the Foundation was moved from Makassar in Sulawesi to 
Jakarta, and the central government in 1954 revoked the monopoly of the Foundation 
over copra exports. Protests by local politicians and military officers against these 
measures were inseparably linked to the regional rebellions. 
The DI and the PRRI set up in West Sumatra shared the objectives of 
opposing to the introduction of the uniform method of local administration based on 
the Java-Madura model and seeking to establish the federal state of Indonesia. Their 
federal state schemes were different, but shared the idea of limiting the central 
government’s authority to a narrow range of diplomacy, national defense and some 
others while substantially expanding the scope of local autonomy. The PRRI made 
contacts with DI movement leaders, such as Qahhar Mudzakkar and Daud Beureu-EH, 
and cooperated in expanding the fronts of the regional rebellions. 
In the background of the regional rebellions lied the growing strength of the 
PKI and as a counterweight to this, the growing influence of the armed forces in the 
national political arena. Internationally, amid the intensifying Cold War, the United 
States in 1955 organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to counter 
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which were stepping up support 
for communists in Asia. At this point, Indonesia was not a member of SEATO, and 
which way Indonesia would go was a matter of grave importance for the security of the 
whole Southeast Asian region. Wary of the growing influence of the PKI in Indonesia, 
the United States had high expectations placed on the DI and the PRRI/Permesta 
regional rebellions as factors that would stem the rise of communist forces in Indonesia. 
The United States not only publicly voiced support for the PRRI/Permesta rebellions, 
but also aided the regional rebellions through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
(Kahin & Kahin [1995]: 120-142).  
As described above, the regional rebellions in the 1950s involved an array of 
factors behind them. Regional leaders did not like Jakarta’s implementation of local 
administration. They were stung by the way how the economic interests were taken 
away by the central government, and they were unhappy about what they got from the 
central government for what they did in the independence war against the Netherlands 
and for the unified republic. Qahhar Mudzakkar and Daud Beureu-EH, leaders of the 
DI, also fought alongside the Republic troops in the war against the Netherlands. Then, 
amid the tense international environment of the Cold War, the United States entered the 
scene with the intention of preventing the communization of Indonesia and supported 
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the regional rebellions. And the U.S. support was not only the response to the Cold 
War but also the move designed to improve the basic environment for natural resources 
exploitation by foreign firms. 
The central government viewed the regional rebellions as a serious threat to 
national unity and used the armed forces to crush them. What has to be emphasized 
here, however, is that neither the DI nor the PRRI/Permesta rebellions hoisted the 
banner of “separation and independence” from Indonesia. What they wanted was not 
the building of a state separate from Indonesia, but the rebuilding of the state of 
Indonesia, that is, the reorganization of the centralized system into a federal system of 
states. On the other hand, in Jakarta, the armed forces came to carry a lot of political 
weight as the force to counter the rise of the PKI. The United States, in a bid to block 
the communization of Indonesia, tried to approach the armed forces without carrying 
through the support for the regional rebellions. Activists who led the regional 
rebellions were disillusioned by the “change of heart” by the United States, on top of 
the simmering grumbles against the central government. 
 
2.2. Center, Region, and Foreign Firms in Natural Resources Exploitation 
 
The Netherlands, as the suzerain of Indonesia, was well aware of the existence of vast 
natural resources in the country before Indonesia’s independence, and many Western 
nations, via the Netherlands, had information about natural resources within the 
territory of the Dutch East Indies. In fact, Royal-Dutch-Shell had been established in 
the Netherlands as far back as in 1885 for the purpose of oil exploitation in Sumatra. 
Oil was one of the natural resources that had been under exploitation since the colonial 
days, and major Western oil companies with the drilling rights were earning huge 
profits. Needless to say, the primary purpose of Japan’s occupation of Indonesia in 
World War II was to have access to the resource.  
Development of natural resources other than oil got into full gear after the 
Soeharto anti-communist regime was installed in 1966. During the years of the 
parliamentary cabinet system or the era of the guided democracy under Soekarno, 
when the domestic political scene was never stable, it was just too risky to embark on 
the exploitation of natural resources that would require vast amounts of investment. 
For this reason, foreign-affiliated mining and exploitation companies got involved in 
all the phases of exploitation, from the surveys on reserves of natural resources and 
exploration to commercial production (see Map 3). 
The Indonesian government, so soon after achieving independence, lacked funds, 
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technologies and human resources to undertake natural resources exploitation on its 
own. Well aware that oil exploitation was profitable operations since the colonial days, 
the government established state-run oil development firms in North Sumatra, South 
Sumatra and Java in the 1950s, and, and set up the state oil corporation Pertamina by 
integrating these firms in 1957. Under the 1960 Oil and Gas Law (Law No. 44/1960), 
foreign firms were required to conclude service contracts with Pertamina, and the 
government let foreign firms produce oil and received a portion of the output. After the 
Soeharto regime was launched in 1966, foreign firms concluded production-sharing 
agreements with Pertamina, under which the government acquired 35% of the total oil 
output minus costs of production. During the oil boom in the 1970s, the government’s 
oil revenue zoomed, and Pertamina also expanded itself to be called “the state within 
the state.” 
Through this process, the perception spread among people that “resources 
exploitation by foreign firms brings in massive profits.” Besides, the sites of natural 
resources exploitation are mostly not in densely populated Java or urban areas, but 
thinly populated regions outside Java Island, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua 
(Irian Jaya). The exploitation sites are isolated from their surrounding areas as sort of 
“enclaves” and as such can be operated in an environment to earn maximum profits 
efficiently. Those “enclaves” provided space where foreign employees of foreign firms 
could spend life just the way back at home. Since all natural resources belong to the 
state under Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, the central government and foreign 
firms primarily undertook exploitation of resources, with no room left for the direct 
participation by local governments or local residents of the regions where natural 
resources exist. Compared with the world of the “enclaves,” there was no change or 
improvement in the life of local residents. Local governments had received no direct 
benefits from foreign firms, either. 
Local governments or local residents are not necessarily seeking life with the 
same conditions as those found in the “enclaves.” They simply want the central 
government and foreign firms to return a small portion of profits they earn from natural 
resources exploitation to local communities in a visible way, such as the employing of 
local residents, subsidies to improve infrastructure for everyday life, and the open use 
of facilities within the “enclaves.” Foreign firms respond to these demands to a certain 
extent. But when foreign firms’ responses are considered insufficient and short of their 
demands, local governments and local residents criticize the “plundering of resources 
by foreign firms and the central government,” getting quite emotional against the 
central government and foreign firms. Even when initial demands are satisfied, their 
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demands are going to escalate with no limits as long as they assume the high 
profitability of resources exploitation, reinforcing the tendency to bum money from 
foreign firms19. 
The battle over natural resources between the central and local governments 
becomes most acute when it involves regions abundantly rich in resources, because 
resources-poor regions have no choice but rely on fund allocations from the central 
government. Apart from such regions as Aceh and Irian Jaya where the central 
government does not mind using armed force, the decentralization drive in 2001 
triggered a chorus of strong opposition to the exploitation of natural resources led by 
foreign firms and the central government in such resources-rich regions as Riau and 
East Kalimantan. The true question being raised by these developments is how regions 
can participate in resources exploitation, in other words, how foreign firms and the 
central government can involve regions in the allocation of profits from natural 
resources exploitation that has so far been monopolized. From here, it is a long way to 
go before the separation and independence from Indonesia looms as a serious issue. 
 
2.3. What Triggered the Blowout of Calls for Separation/Independence? 
 
In natural resources exploitation projects in most regions in Indonesia, though to 
differing degrees, natural resources are being taken out without any benefits to regions, 
job opportunities are denied to local residents, and even when jobs are made available 
to local residents, they are placed in positions under outlanders. The central 
government justifies these practices by citing the shortage of skilled workers and 
technical expertise on the part of regions or intense international competition. Forced 
into the position of “by-standers,” local residents, as they become aware of how 
profitable resources exploitation is, begin to seek reasonable rewards from the central 
government. In some cases, local people intentionally cite anti-central government 
(anti-Java) feelings in local communities as a tactics to draw out as many concessions 
as possible from outlanders. When outlanders fail to read such a signal and offer no 
concessions, local people’s dissatisfaction could turn into more radical movements. 
Once set afire, what started as a scheme to obtain only small economic benefits could 
escalate into movements over which even those who initiated them lose control.  
If the central government responds to such developments with the oppression 
                                                   
19 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in the 1970s tried to extract funds for its activities from foreign 
firms developing oil and gas in Aceh. After foreign firms turned the demand down, the GAM grew 
increasingly hostile to them. 
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by force, local residents, whose houses were burned down and relatives were killed, 
out of the sorrow over the victims, arouse hatred against central government 
organizations that actually committed horrendous actions against them (the armed 
forces and police). On the other hand, the central government, for which the most 
important thing is to ensure the environment for foreign firms to keep exploiting 
natural resources without worries, hardens its stance to prevent local residents from 
causing disruptive and destructive actions. Local residents react with hardened 
attitudes, too. In a vicious circle of such developments, the central government, out of 
fear for local residents’ hatred directed against them, start arresting and torturing 
suspects, further fueling local residents’ ill feelings toward the central government (the 
armed forces and police) and prompting some to take up arms for retaliation. Some 
back groups or forces that are capable to fight back the central government (the armed 
forces and police), and still others volunteer to join such groups themselves.  
Separation and independence movements in Aceh and Papua have presumably 
gone through these processes. If the situation has not deteriorated that much in other 
regions, it is only because either the central government has yet to resort to 
high-handed means to stoke hatred among local residents or the function of adjustment 
is still at work between the central government and regions. 
 
(1) Aceh 
The kingdom of Aceh fought against the Netherlands most fiercely in the independent 
war, and readily became a part of the RI when the republic gained independence. In 
Aceh in the years immediately following the independence, rivalry was intense 
between local aristocrats who were taken into confidence by the Dutch during the 
colonial days and the All-Aceh Ulama League (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh: PUSI). 
Despite Aceh’s outstanding contribution in the independence war, the central 
government of the RI did not grant it the status of province, and instead made it a part 
of North Sumatra Province. The central government also appointed local aristocrats 
with administrative experiences under colonial rule as administrators of local 
governments. The PUSI, which contributed to the republic’s independence and wanted 
to be an independent province for its uniqueness, was deeply disappointed by the 
central government’s responses, and Daud Beureu-EH, the PUSI’s chairman, initiated 
the Darul Islam (DI) movement, aiming to turn Indonesia into a federal state built on 
Islam. The central government separated Aceh from North Sumatra Province as a 
special province in 1959. But this did not totally mitigate the province’s distrust in and 
repulsion against the central government, and the DI continued until 1965 in Aceh. 
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Leading the separation and independence movement in Aceh at present is the 
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: GAM)20. GAM’s top leader, Hasan di 
Tiro, was one of the junior staff of Daud Beureu-EH who led the DI. Originally, they 
were not seeking separation or independence from Indonesia, or were not aiming to 
establish a separate Islamic state. They simply wanted to be a part of the federal state. 
In 1976, however, Tiro unilaterally declared Aceh’s independence, calling “the Islamic 
State of Aceh.” 
In a campaign to raise funds for their activities, GAM activists, around the 
time when exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) began through Lhokseumawe in the 
latter half of the 1970s, demanded foreign firms in Aceh to pay business levies, and 
when they refused to make the payments, started attacking foreign residents as well as 
local lumbers. Escaping the pursuit by the armed forces, Tiro and his supporters left 
Aceh in 1979 and have been appealing for international support for Aceh from Sweden, 
where he sought asylum. Beginning in 1986, after the Soeharto regime made Pancasila 
the only principles to be embraced by any political or social organizations, GAM began 
sending young Acehnese to Libya for military training. These young Acehnese started 
coming home from around 1988, and launched operations to take weapons from the 
armed forces and police, and to attack policemen and military officers on duty in Aceh. 
In response to those developments, Indonesia’s armed forces designated Aceh 
as the military operation region (Daerah Operasi Militer: DOM) in 1988, and began 
rounding up GAM activities and their sympathizers, launching military operations, 
during which some 6,000 people were reportedly killed. The DOM designation was 
lifted in 1998, partly in the face of international criticism against the military 
operations as human rights violations. But the armed forces continued with clearing 
operations in Aceh, despite the policy of dialogue adopted by the Habibie government 
and the succeeding government of President Abdurrahman Wahid. At the insistence of 
the armed forces, the Abdurrahman Wahid government in April 2001 issued 
Presidential Decision No. 4, 2001, approving the armed forces’ support for police to 
restore public order in Aceh21. 
                                                   
20 Based in Sweden, GAM members are seeking international support for the cause of Aceh’s 
independence. GAM has been split into two groups: the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front 
(ASNLF) under direct control of Hasan di Tiro, and the Free Aceh Movement Government 
Assembly (Majelis Pemerintah GAM: MP-GAM) that renounces armed struggles. The former started 
military training in Libya in 1986, and sent Acehnese who finished training courses back to Aceh 
one after another in 1988-1989. 
21 Before the presidential decree was issued, the armed forces already sent the security forces into 
Aceh, including Kopassus, the Army special units, which led the campaign against pro-independence 
forces in East Timor. 
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Aceh is the home to one of Indonesia’s largest concentration of natural gas 
fields, and development of natural gas has been under way there since the 1970s. 
Exxon-Mobil of the United States, which exploited the gas fields, suspended 
operations in March-August 2001, citing the deteriorating security conditions, and 
actually the facilities were blasted in April of that year. Exxon-Mobil has been heavily 
relying on the Indonesian police and armed forces to guard the natural gas exploitation 
facilities, but has also been criticized that heavy guards around the facilities harmed 
local residents around the facilities. In his connection, suspicions surfaced that heavy 
equipment and barracks Exxon-Mobil made available to the police and armed forces 
were used to suppress local residents, and a newspaper report said a human rights 
group filed a lawsuit against the head office of Exxon-Mobil in the Untied States22. 
In order to bring the protracted confrontation with GAM to an end and calm 
the separation and independence movement in Aceh, the central government 
introduced to parliament a bill for special autonomy for the Aceh Special Province 
apart from the two 1999 decentralization bills. Meanwhile, the government of the Aceh 
Special Province submitted its own version of a bill for special autonomy to parliament. 
As the MPR Decision No. 4, 1999, demanded an end to debate on the bills for special 
autonomy for Aceh and Papua by May 1, 2001, the government first sought to deal 
with the issue with an alternative government decree. But the government decided 
against the idea of alternative government decree on April 27, and by extending the 
debate schedule with the backing of MPR, decided to take up only the bill introduced 
by the Aceh Special Provincial government. In the end, on August 9, 2001, the special 
autonomy law for the Aceh special province as the 2001 Propinsi Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (the Aceh Special Autonomy Law: ASAL) was enacted (Law No. 
18/2001). 
The ASAL provides for the application of Islamic law in Aceh, direct elections 
of local government heads, and a large increase in provincial revenue under special 
autonomy arrangements (in the coming eight years, the province is given 70% of 
revenue from oil and natural gas, with the provincial take being reduced to 50% in the 
ninth year onward). Compared with the local take of 15% for oil and 30% for natural 
gas as stipulated under the Law No. 25/1999, the arrangements under the ASAL 
represent substantial concessions on the part of the central government. But it is 
premature to speculate whether the enactment of the ASAL will directly lead to a final 
settlement of the Aceh problem. The security conditions in Aceh have not improved 
                                                   
22 Banerjee, Neela, “Lawsuit Says Exxon Aided Rights Abuses,” New York Times, June 21, 2001. 
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since then, with the assignations of influential local politicians and senior government 
officials still reported. 
 
(2) Papua 
When the RI declared independence, West Irian (Irian Jaya, now Papua) was still under 
Dutch colonial rule as the Dutch New Guinea. While other regions joined the RI by 
1950, the Netherlands refused to let the territory to be incorporated into Indonesia. 
After Indonesian troops carried out the military campaign to free West Irian in 
1961-1962, the sovereignty over West Irian was transferred from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia via the United Nations, and West Irian was incorporated into Indonesia in 
1963. 
The separation and independence movement in Papua can be traced back to 
the legitimacy of the 1963 incorporation of West Irian into Indonesia. Like GAM in 
Aceh, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka: OPM), which has an 
armed organization, is continuing its anti-government activities in Papua, mostly in the 
mountain regions, with sporadic incidents such as the kidnappings of Westerners. In 
the 1980s, there were frequent clashes between OPM and security troops over the 
hoisting of the rebel flag (Morning Star). 
The Habibie government, in an effort to stem the rise in Papua’s movements 
toward separation and independence, enacted a law in 1999 to divide the Irian Jaya 
Province (at that time and now Papua Province) into the three provinces of West, 
Central and East Irian Jaya, and appointed governors for the three provinces. But the 
new measure did not work and now exists in name only. President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
as he did with Aceh, adopted the approach of dialogue with Papua, and when he visited 
Jayapura, the provincial capital, on January 1, 2000, he accepted the change of the 
province’s name from “Irian Jaya” to “Papua” as well as the raising of the Morning 
Star flag if it is lifted together with the Indonesian national flag, giving the impression 
that the central government has made substantial concessions. Since then, as if to 
provoke the central government, incidents of the raising of the Morning Star flag 
without the Indonesian flag going up together occurred frequently, and in one incident 
in Wamena in central Papua, Indonesian security troops fired on residents who hoisted 
the Morning Star flag, leading to the major rioting there. Amid the rising tide of 
sentiment against Javanese and Buginese from South Sulawesi, many outlanders and 
their families were forced to leave Papua. The security forces believe President 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s irresponsible remarks caused the situation in Papua to 
deteriorate. 
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As seen in Aceh, the Indonesian armed forces and police kept the tight grip 
over residents in Papua. The high-handed attitude of the armed forces and police led to 
frequent troubles with local residents. Also, the armed forces and police occasionally 
intervened into residents’ organizations for economic benefits, another sources of local 
residents’ antipathy toward them. As in Aceh again, security troops usually take 
preemptive forceful measures before local residents’ frustration erupts into concrete 
action of protest, helping to escalate the mutual distrust. 
In May 2000, the Papua Conference was convened in the provincial capital of 
Jayapura to discuss the future of Papua, and President Abdurrahman Wahid’s donation 
of one billion rupiahs to cover the cost of the conference did not help prevent an 
overwhelming majority of participants calling for separation and independence from 
Indonesia. In a seminar on a bill for the special autonomy for Papua held in March 
2001, a majority of participants rejected the local autonomy formula and insisted on 
separation and independence. The Presidium of Papuan Leaders (Presidium Dewan 
Papua), that hosted the Papua Conference, has no particular links with OPM, and the 
separation and independence movement in Papua is not necessarily monolithic. 
The bill for the Papua Special Autonomy, jointly prepared by the Papua 
Provincial Government, the provincial assembly and scholars from Cenderawasih 
University, called, among other things, for the permission to raise the ethnic flag and 
sing the ethnic anthem, and the allocation of 80% of revenue from natural resources to 
the province. The government had already submitted its own version of the special 
autonomy bill to parliament, but President Abdurrahman Wahid asked parliament to 
consider the provincial version as well. President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who 
succeeds Wahid, scrapped the central government’s bill on her own responsibility to 
give precedence to the provincial bill. After some amendments, it passed parliament on 
October 22, 2001, and was enacted on November 21 as the Law on Special Autonomy 
of the Province of Papua (the Papua Special Autonomy Law: PSAL) (Law No. 
21/2001). 
Under the two decentralization bills promulgated in 1999, the focus of local 
administration was placed on kabupaten/kota. But the PSAL, as with the case of the 
ASAL, effectively targets the provincial level. The basis for the renewed focus on 
provinces in local administration is that the provincial governments in a position to 
adjust for the wide gaps in fiscal positions between kabupaten/kota. However, 
relatively wealthy kabupaten/kota, such as Kabupaten Sorong and Kabupaten Merauke, 
opposed the PSAL over a loss of administrative powers to the provincial government. 
In fact, when the PSAL is enforced, the provincial government’s fiscal 
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revenue will increase dramatically (for example, in the coming twenty-five years, the 
province is given 70% of revenue from oil and natural gas, with the provincial take 
being reduced to 50% in the twenty-sixth year onward). As in Aceh, the provincial 
government in Papua now has a legal basis to participate in the fair allocation of profits 
from the exploitation of natural resources. But the provincial government has yet to 
develop a strategy for regional development that takes this new factor into 
consideration. As Aceh has foreign firms exploiting its natural gas resources, in Papua, 
U.S. mining firm Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold through the subsidiary PT 
Freeport Indonesia is producing copper ore and gold. In the 1990s, local residents 
began to ask the company to promote the hiring of local labor and support social 
development. In response, Freeport seems to be responding to these requests 
positively23. 
Within the provincial government, tribalism still persists, with important posts 
dominated by certain tribes. As this trend indicates, the local environment has yet to 
ripen to generate a sense of unity, or something like a Papuan nationalism, that may be 
needed as the foundation for any attempt to seek separation and independence from 
Indonesia. Given the far greater weight given to tribal identity, the current political 
conditions in the province perhaps do not support any sustained movement toward 
separation and independence. Indonesia’s policy and methods for security maintenance 
in Papua have been consistent under the Megawati government, and the improvement 
in security conditions in the province also seem to owe much to the fact that the heads 
of propinsi, kabupaten and kota governments, local assembly speakers and other key 
posts are dominated by key tribal persons. 
 
(3) Summary 
As discussed above, the circumstances and backgrounds of separation and 
independence movements in Aceh and Papua have several things in common. These 
movements were apparently triggered by the exploitation of natural resources in their 
provinces by foreign firms and the central government that provided the protection for 
exploitation work. In the eyes of local residents, the central government that is acting 
as the security guard of foreign firms is no different from the Dutch colonial 
government and local governments working as its servants. The government was the 
                                                   
23 Under the agreements with two local tribes, Kamoro and Amungme, PT Freeport since 1996 has 
been providing an amount equivalent to 1% of its annual profit to them through LPMI, a local NGO. 
The payment amounted to 175 billion Rupiahs in 2000 alone, and is expected to reach almost the 
like amount in 2001. There are views that the local residents are not making full and efficient use of 
these payments (the electronic edition of Gatra, November 5, 2001). 
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organization to supervise and control local residents, and was never the organization 
for the autonomy by local residents. 
The situations in Aceh and Papua seem to have been aggravated by posterior 
factors, rather than by specific historical or cultural backgrounds. Both provinces went 
through the fundamentally common process where the amplification of mutual distrust 
and the intervention by force prevented rational dialogue, caused the intensification of 
mutual hatred and ultimately led to movements for separation and independence. In 
fact, this process can largely be applicable to other regions as well. In its efforts to 
maintain national unity, if the central government fails to deal with these posteriori 
factors properly, it could risk creating an irreparable situation. 
The ASAL for Aceh and PSAL for Papua provide for a bigger piece of the pie 
of profits from natural resources exploitation previously monopolized by the central 
government and foreign firms. The central government used the special autonomy laws 
as a means of preventing the separation and independence of Aceh and Papua and 
keeping them in the RI. On the other hand, the provincial governments of Aceh and 
Papua, by occasionally showing off the rise of separatist sentiments in their provinces, 
succeeded in wringing big concessions out of the central government over the 
allocation of profits from resources development. In exchange, however, the provincial 
governments have now taken on much bigger responsibilities for maintaining security 
and social stability within their provinces. 
 
3. Current State of Decentralization and Problems 
 
3.1. Worrisome Developments 
 
In the process of decentralization, there is much talk about the possibility of local 
governments, the principal players in local administration, displaying self-centered 
behaviors going after narrow regional interests. For example, upstream local 
governments may clash with downstream local governments in river basin management, 
or there might be disagreements between local governments of regions supplying 
natural resources and raw materials and local governments of urban regions where they 
are processed and exports. 
One of the features of the Law No. 22/1999 is the call for the separation of 
administration and legislature at local levels in favor of the check-and-balance function 
between the two institutions. In reality, however, there have already arisen problems 
involving collusive ties between local assemblies and heads of government. The 
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transfer of a host of administrative powers from the central to local governments could 
help facilitate the race for undue interests among local political elites. In particular, 
local assembly members, who have newly acquired the enhanced function of checking 
the performance of the heads of local governments, may seek to substantially raise their 
own salaries in debating the fair allocation of budgetary expenditures. There have been 
not a few instances where the salaries paid to assembly members accounted for more 
than half the budgets. Local assembly members may also press the heads of 
government to accord them various other benefits including the official vehicles for 
them, and when they are not treated well, may “threaten” to reject annual responsibility 
speeches the heads of government have to present for approval or not support their 
reelection bids. In order to calm things down, the heads of government have no choice 
but to concede to assembly members. Indonesia’s local politics has a long way to go in 
shaking off the structure of scrounging, with new types of cozy ties being formed under 
the new system. 
Furthermore, as seen in the case of Papua, there are a growing number of 
instances across the country where only “local sons” (putera daerah) can get elected 
the heads of government or hold important posts of local governments. Some localities 
are even giving a legal basis to such practices by adopting ordinances to that effect. But 
the definitions of putera daerah vary among local governments24, and the jockeying for 
powers among local political elites tend to determine such definitions to serve their 
interests. 
There also are problems with local taxes and local retributions. Under the 
weight of heavy external debts, both the central and local governments in Indonesia 
face serious fiscal deficits. Under the fiscal decentralization arrangements, the central 
governments transfer general allocation funds (DAU) to local governments, but the bulk 
of these funds are used for current expenditures, such as salaries to government officials 
transferred to local offices and positions. Since it is not easy to increase the amounts of 
DAU and the borrowing of funds from external sources by local government is still 
banded in principle, local governments have to find their own sources of revenue and 
invite private-sector direct investment.  
The biggest obstacle to local governments’ efforts to expand the base of own 
revenue sources was the 1997 Law on Local Taxes and Retributions (Law No. 19/1997), 
                                                   
24 For example, the Papua Special Autonomy Law stipulates that only Papua aborigines of 
Melanesia origin (orang asli Papua) can hold the post of the head of local government, relying on 
the concept of dividing residents into Papua aborigines and Papua residents living in the province 
(penduduk provinsi Papua). In the new province of Gorontalo on Sulawesi Island, meanwhile, local 
residents are defined as “those who are born and raised” in the province, rejecting tribalism. 
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that limits the kinds of local taxes and retributions local governments are allowed to 
collect. The enactment of the law reflects the different ways of responses shown by the 
central and local governments to the sharp falls in oil prices in the mid-1980s. As the 
state coffers on oil- and natural gas-related revenues for about 70% of its total revenue, 
the falls in oil prices immediately resulted in the serious shortfall of revenue. In a bid to 
grow out of the heavy dependence on oil and gas revenue under the structural 
adjustment policy guided by the World Bank, the Indonesian government carried out 
drastic tax reform, including the introduction of the value-added tax and the sales tax on 
luxury goods and achieved a change in the state’s revenue structure. But local 
governments failed to make similar responses. The tax reform focused on national taxes, 
and did not touch on local taxes or local retributions. To cover their revenue shortfalls, 
local governments created an array of new local taxes and retributions. While the 
structural adjustment policies pursued by the central government helped encourage 
private-sector vitality and privatization and contributed to the liberalization of 
economic activities, the sharp rises in local taxes and retributions hampered the 
efficiency in economic activities sought under structural adjustment policies. In view of 
such developments, the central government enacted the Law No. 19/1997 to limit the 
kinds and scope of local taxes and retributions that local governments are entitled to 
collect. 
Local governments argued that the smooth implementation of decentralization 
requires the revision of the Law No. 19/1997, because without the discretionary right to 
impose taxes, they should not be able to boost their fiscal resources (fiscal 
independence). The central government was reluctant to comply, but eventually agreed 
to revise the Law No. 19/1997 and enacted the 2000 Law on Local Taxes and Local 
Retributions (Law No. 34/2000), allowing local governments to create new local taxes 
and retributions at their own discretion, though only when certain conditions are met25 
and with the approval of local assemblies. In the wake of the new law’s enactment, 
local governments rushed to create a number of new taxes and retributions, including 
the surcharge on agricultural products being shipped out of their regions, the traffic 
                                                   
25 The conditions cited here include: (1) the object of taxation is in the region; (2) not against public 
interests; (3) not contradict other taxes or retributions; (4) the object of taxation has full potential as 
such; (5) not give a negative economic impact on the regional economy; and (6) give heed to 
fairness and the capacity of residents. But local governments are not required to conduct scientific 
preliminary surveys on potential impacts of the introduction of the proposed local tax or local 
retribution, allowing a plenty of room for unreasonable taxes or retributions to be easily introduced. 
When local taxes or local retributions legislated by local governments are judged to have negative 
impacts, the central government is authorized to order local governments to retract those taxes or 
retributions. 
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surcharge on long-haul trucks going through their regions, the traffic surcharge on 
heavy-load trucks, and the tax on use of ground water. 
While well aware of the importance of direct investment by the private sector, 
few local governments had the experience of actually bringing direct investment to 
their regions on their own. Partly for this reason, local government officials really had 
little idea about how the new taxes and retributions were going to affect the investment 
climate. Moreover, few local governments provide investors with the information on 
their local taxes and retributions. According to a report released by the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) in September 2001, over 1,000 kinds of 
local taxes and retributions are seriously affecting business activities. Further, as of 
November 2001, of the total of 1,503 local taxes and retributions across the country 
examined by a Ministry of Interior team, there are serious problems with 105. The team 
recommended to the Minister of Interior that 68 of the 105 taxes and retributions should 
be abolished. 
 
3.2. Favorable Developments 
 
There are favorable developments, too, in the course of the implementation of 
decentralization. Some local governments are showing ingenious initiatives in line with 
decentralization. Kabupaten Takalar in South Sulawesi Province, in a joint effort with 
state-owned telephone company PT Telkom, introduced the internet-based computer 
system to handle at a single location as many as 12 kinds of permit and approval 
procedures, including the building permit, location permit, resident registration 
certificate (KTP), and land ownership certificate. Issuance of the resident registration 
certificate takes only five minutes now, as against at least two to three days previously. 
The introduction of this system also greatly increased the level of transparency in 
resident services, allowing little room for irregularities. The kabupaten government 
succeeded in restoring residents’ confidence in the government. 
Decentralization is also encouraging the horizontal cooperation between local 
governments, in addition to the existing vertical cooperation between the central and 
local governments. In Sulawesi, governors of four provinces held talks on the rioting in 
Kabupaten Poso of Central Sulawesi Province and measures to help evacuees. 
Following this first meeting, the four governors met in Makassar in October 2000 and 
announced a plan of action on specific regional cooperation, signed an agreement on 
regional cooperation, and agreed to establish the joint office for cooperation among the 
four Sulawesi provinces. Regional cooperation that started in Sulawesi is beginning to 
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affect other regions. Similar moves to seek inter-provincial cooperation started in 
Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java-Bali. The process of decentralization from 2001 gives 
greater importance to activities of cross-sectional organizations such as the association 
of provincial governors, the association of kabupaten heads (Bupati), the association of 
mayors, the association of provincial assembly speakers, the association of kabupaten 
assembly speakers, and the association of municipal assembly speakers. In addition to 
the role of lobbying groups for the central government, these organizations can be 
expected to perform key roles in building the networks of regional cooperation. 
 
4. Decentralization as an Opportunity to Learn 
 
Indonesia is the country that is composed of a variety of regions with different social 
and cultural backgrounds and different administrative and governance methods, with 
the only common thread being the colonization by the Netherlands. Densely populated 
regions have few natural resources and thinly populated regions have an abundance of 
resources. This geographical situation opened the way for the structure of domestic 
colonization where densely populated regions drew greater economic benefits from the 
development of natural resources located in thinly populated regions. In governing this 
type of a state, the centralized system would reinforce the structure of domestic 
colonization, while the highly decentralized system would make densely populated 
regions with few resources worse off and the formation of a single state less meaningful. 
Thus, sustaining Indonesia as a state would require a lot of ingenuity from various 
angles and aspects, including methods and know-how of governing, not limited to the 
form of governance such as a unified state or a federal system. If these efforts were 
abandoned in favor of saving on the short-run cost of governance, the medium- and 
long-term costs would eventually prove to be much higher. 
Discussions in this paper traced many causes of the rivalry between the central 
and the local in Indonesia as described above to the question of the fair distribution of 
profits from natural resources exploitation. This paper also pointed to the possibility 
that the heightened mutual distrust between the central and the local in the course of 
profit allocations could develop into conflicts with violent force. Separation and 
independence movements in Aceh and Papua can be understood in this context. 
Decentralization has opened the way for local governments and local residents to 
participate in the allocation of profits from natural resources as new actors, and the 
question that arises is how to adjust the interests between the new actors and longtime 
actors such as the central government and foreign firm. In that sense, the conventional 
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method of profit allocation may provide a reference material but cannot serve as a 
model for the future sharing of profits. There is no other way than all the actors, new 
and old, in the play striving to find new methods and know-how on a trial-and-error 
basis. And, to do so, all the actors involved, from the central government and local 
governments to local residents and foreign firms, need to change their attitudes or ways 
of thinking. 
At the same time, decentralization demands the self-subsistence of regions, not 
necessarily separation and independence. Local governments, instead of depending on 
the central government or scrounging some benefits off foreign firms, should turn to 
local residents and local resources they have and formulate reasonable and realistic 
strategies of development on their own. They should reinforce administrative 
capabilities, sharpen regional originalities and thus boost the competitiveness of their 
own regions to ensure their survival in the increasingly globalize economy. 
Through the process so far of nation state building, Indonesia has formed the 
framework of the state through the centralization of powers. But that framework may 
have been just for a fragile master-servant relationship, or an ostensible national unity, 
buttressed only by the central government’s ability to control and ensure security. 
Decentralization has placed Indonesia in the stage of a true nation state building by 
letting it step into the question of the real substance of the nation state, or how to shape 
the future relationship between the central and the local. The historical experience in 
the strong centralized system was quite valuable in pursuit of a new shape of the state. 
Decentralization should be promoted steadily by fully digesting and learning from that 
experience. And local governments, not only the central government, should get 
involved in the process of the nation state building. The process of the nation state 
building and pursuit of a new ideal state require changes in the attitudes and 
consciousness of those participating in the process. Decentralization does not simply 
signify the transfer of administrative powers from the central to local governments, but 
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Table: History of Central-Local Relationship in Indonesia 
 
Year Politics Decentralization Natural Resource Affairs on Local Politics 
1945 Proclaimation of Independence 





      
1946         









    
1949 Establishment of RUSI       
1950 Establishment of Unified RI     
Rebellion of Andi 





1951       
1952       
1953       
1954       
1955       
1956 
Balanced Finance 




























      
Darul Islam (West 
Java, Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, and 
Other Areas) 
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1961     






1963     
Admission of 
West Irian to 
Indonesia 
1964       
1965 
 





  Coup of 30 september 1965 
 
1966 MPRS Decision No. 16/1966     






Contract of PT 
Freeport 
  











1969     
Official Decision 
on Admission of 
West Irian to 
Indonesia 
  
1970         
1971         






No. 4/1973 The 1st Oil Boom     
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1974 





Malari Riot in 
Jakarta   









1976     
Annexation of 





1977         
1978   
PT Inco Started 
Nikkel 
Exploitation, 
Arun LNG Plant 
Started Operation 
in Aceh 
    
1979 





Hasan di Tiro's 
Exile to Sweden
1980   







1981         
1982         
1983     Misterious Shooting 
1984     
Resistance 
Movements of 
OPM in Papua 
Tanjung Priok 
Piots, Bom Attack 
to BCA Office





Pancasila as the 
Sole Basis by 
Law on Social 
Organization 
1986       






        
IDE Research Paper No. 2, August 2003 
39 






1989   
Exploitation 
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Tragedy of 
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No. 8/1995 on 
Decentralizaiton 
Experiment 
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as DOM, More 
than 6000 People 
Dead 
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1999 Habibie Government 
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Administration 
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